Private Divestiture: Antitrust\u27s Latest Problem Child by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 41 Issue 3 Article 4 
1973 
Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 569 (1973). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol41/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
COMMENTS
PRIVATE DIVESTITURE: ANTITRUST'S LATEST
PROBLEM CHILD
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1926, when asked by a private litigant to order divestiture, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated: "The main remedy sought
is dissolution of the combination. Section 16 [of the Clayton Act] never has
been held to reach such a case. The result sought is practically the same as
would be asked for in a suit by the Attorney General."' On July 14, 1972, in
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Rlctronics
Corp.,'2 Judge Pence, of the District Court of Hawaii, stated: "In the absence
of solid precedent or clear legislative history, this court's own research into
the availability of divestiture and mandatory injunction to a private plaintiff
suing under § 16 has impelled this court to conclude that both such equitable
remedies are available to private plaintiffs under § 16.Y3 Thus, the ever-e.xpand-
ing law of mergers and acquisitions has apparently acquired a new problem-
child, the private injunctive action for dissolution or divestiture.
The antitrust laws grew out of a dire economic need to restrict the usurpation
of trusts, and to curtail the very real threats of imminent monopolization of
major industry.4 From legislative discussion,5 it seems probable that the framers
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts had no conception of the complex business
framework that would evolve in the 1950's and 1960's.0 Even the Celler-Kefauver
Amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act7 did not really conceive of the vast
scope of inter-corporate connection that would evolve with the widespread adop-
tion of the conglomerate form.3 In fact, as recently as 1969, the Subcommittee
on Antitrust of the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings to attempt
1. Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378, 379 (6th Cir. 1926),
cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927).
2. 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972).
3. Id. at 1207 (footnotes omitted).
4. See notes 77-95 infra and accompanying text.
5. For an excellent discussion of the events leading up to the adoption of the Sherman
Act see H. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, Organization of an American Tradition
9-232 (1955).
6. See McKinney, Section 7 of the Clayton Act as Applied to Conglomerate Mergers:
Incipient Antitrust Doctrine, in Conglomerate Mergers and Acquisitions: Opinion and
Analysis, 44 St John's L. Rev. 635 (1970). See also Shea, Antitrust Policy and the
Conglomerate Firm: "A Rose is a Rose is a Rose," id. at 533; Van Cise, Aristotle and
Congress, id. at 538; Vanderstar, Conglomerate Mergers: The Developing Antitrust Guide-
lines, id. at 596.
7. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 899, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, amending 15 US.C. § 18
(1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)).
8. See note 6 supra.
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to determine the economic effects and projected outcome of the present con-
glomerate form.9
It has been admitted that the Government is unable to keep pace with the
sheer volume of needed antitrust litigation. 10 Further, the fact that divestiture
may be the only effective form of relief for illegally acquired companies against
acquiring companies, as well as for competitors threatened or injured by such
acquisitions, has led most commentators to conclude that there is indeed a
need for private actions seeking divestiture relief.11 However, it has been stated
by several courts that standing to bring actions to divest lies wholly within the
authority of the Government. Indeed, prior to 1972, no court had decreed di-
vestiture at the instance of a private plaintiff.1 2
II. Tnm ITT CASE
In 1967, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation ("ITT") filed
an action under section 16 of the Clayton Act13 against General Telephone &
Electronics Corporation ("GTE") and one of its subsidiaries asking for di-
vestiture and other forms of mandatory injunctive relief. The claims were based
on two separate contentions: (1) that by acquisition of certain manufacturers
of telephone communications equipment (Leich Electric Company ("Leich"),
Automatic Electric Company ("AE"), Lenkurt Co., Inc. ("Lenkurt") and
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. ("Sylvania")), GTE "became a vertically in-
tegrated telephone company, with its telephone operating companies buying
almost all of their transmission equipment, switching systems, apparatus and
other telephone communications equipment from GTE's own manufacturing sub-
sidiaries";' 4 and (2) that by the acquisition of certain telephone operating
9. "In 1950, only 38 percent of acquired assets were attributable to large conglomerate
mergers. By 1968 the proportion had increased to 90 percent. Merger activity in this period
was redirected, not reduced. The very success of the Celler-Kefauver Act in discouraging
anticompetitive horizontal and vertical combinations has strongly contributed to the merger
trend problem now under study by this committee." Hearings on Conglomerate Corporations
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 7, at 2 (1970) (statement of R. McLaren).
10. Miles Kirkpatrick, Chairman of the FTC, has stated: "'All the King's Horses and
All the King's Men' of the FTC and the Antitrust Division combined are simply not sufficient
to deal with every competitive defect existing in every industry throughout the economy."
The FTC Antitrust Enforcement, 1971 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Antitrust Symposium, at 19.
11. See, e.g., Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 48
Texas L. Rev. 54 (1969); Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy
for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 267 (1964).
12. "The courts have differed as to whether divestiture is a remedy available to private
litigants, and, to date, no court has ordered divestiture in a private suit." The Section of
Antitrust Law of the American Bar Ass'n, Antitrust Developments 1955-1968, at 98 (1968)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Developments].
13. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). For a full discussion of the application of section 16, the
private injunctive relief provision of the Clayton Act, see text accompanying notes 130-52
infra.
14. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronics
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1161 (D. Hawaii 1972).
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companies,' 5 competing manufacturers of telephone equipment were foreclosed
from selling telephone equipment to GTE's operating companies, in restraint
of trade and "to the detriment of actual and potential competition by such
manufacturers.'"
Both the action and the opinion in ITT are based on an extremely complex
economic situation, and involve a multitude of legal claims that are beyond the
scope of this discussion. This Comment considers only those issues which relate
directly to the grant of the divestiture remedy, and the reasoning behind the
result. However, to convey a full understanding of the choice of remedy, it is
necessary to touch briefly upon the economic background of the action and
prior litigation.
A. Telephone Communications and the Relevant Market
In the early part of the twentieth century, telephone communication was of a
largely local, intrastate nature, and was completely dominated by the Bell
Company.' 7 The Interstate Commerce Commission, under whose regulation tele-
phone companies came when they moved interstate, was still essentially a rail-
road commission; from 1910 to 1934, the Commission concerned itself almost
exclusively with rate structures, and this only in a "desultory and perfunctory"
fashion.' 8 By 1935, the telephone market had become divided into two distinct
parts, Bell and non-Bell, with Bell in a position of unquestioned dominance.20
Of the non-Bell telephone companies, generally termed "independents," GTE
soon became the largest.20 It is clear today that the Bell System is vertically
15. California Water and Telephone Co., West Coast Telephone Co., The Southwestern
States Telephone Co., Western Utilities Corp. (the Western Utilities Group]; Central Iowa
Telephone Co.; Hawaiian Telephone Co. ("Hawaiian"). Id. Hawaiian was the only GTE
subsidiary named as defendant under the action. ITT also filed claims under the Hawaiian
antitrust laws. Id.; see Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 480-4, -7, -9 (1968).
16. 351 F. Supp. at 1161.
17. Id. at 1167.
18. Id. at 1166, citing E. Smead, Governmental Promotion and Regulation of Business
741 (1969).
19. Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation-The Silent Crisis, 34 Law & Contemp. Prob.
299, 306 (1969). When the FCC was established in 1934 it was faced with a fait accompli
in the overwhelming market power of Bell. Of 17,465,000 telephones in 1935, the Bell System
(which is composed of American Telephone and Telegraph Co., Western Electric Co., their
subsidiaries, and the Bell Telephone operating companies nationwide) owned and operated
14,280,000 (82%). 351 F. Supp. at 1169-70. This dominance has continued into the present,
with even slight gains in the Bell System market share (95,942,000 of 115,501,000; 83% in
1969). Id. at 1170. It is also notable that total revenue from telephones in 1969 was
$18,672,000,000, of which over $16 billion was Bell System revenue. Id.
20. 351 F. Supp. at 1170. GTE had a 1969 total market share of 7.8% (9,022,400
telephones) which is 46% of the independent total. While the Bell market share Is immense,
it must be recognized that GTE revenues exceeded $1 billion in 1969, still a sizeable amount.
It should be noted that the next five independent phone companies, together with GTE,
make up almost 75% of the independent telephone operating market. Id.
19731
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integrated,21 an arrangement that was sanctioned by the Bell Consent Decree of
1956.22 That decree permitted American Telephone and Telegraph Company
("ATT") to maintain ownership of and virtually exclusive dealing in telephone
communications equipment with Western Electric Company ("WE"), AT's
manufacturing arm.23 Thus, the decree was far from successful in an anti-
monopolistic sense. With 83 percent of the telephone market, Bell is by far
the largest purchaser of telephone communications equipment, probably exceed-
ing $2.5 billion of the $3 billion gross sales market. In 1968 and 1969, WE
supplied more than 99 percent of the Bell System's needs, leaving about $22-26
million in annual sales to the Bell System for all the independent manufac-
turers combined. 24 Thus, a market division had arisen, where independents
served independents, and Bell served Bell. It is against this backdrop that the
ITT/GTE suit arose, a battle between giants who are relative dwarfs in their
field.
With such overwhelming market control by a single corporation, it was seen
as a competitive necessity that the independent telephone operating companies
themselves begin vertical integration efforts. GTE, the largest of the indepen-
dents, did so by a series of acquisitions during the early 1950's, 2 including that
of AE, at the time the "'largest producer of communications equipment for
the independent telephone industry.' "'2
21. As early as "1901, Bell System companies entered into supply contracts with WE
FWestern Electric], American Telephone & Telegraph's (ATT) wholly-owned manufacturing
subsidiary. By 1913 each Bell company bad entered into such a contract. In 1949 . . . the
Attorney General initiated an antitrust action against WE and ATT," under Sherman Act
sections 1, 2 and 3, to compel divestiture of WE and its subsequent division into three
separate companies, and to terminate all contracts and agreements between Bell companies
and WE for the sale of communications equipment. The action was based on the fact that
WE made it virtually impossible for any other manufacturer to sell to the Bell System.
Id. at 1175.
22. 1956 Trade Cas. II 68,246.
23. Id. at 71,137-38. By that decree, ATT was allowed to maintain ownership of WE,
under, essentially, two conditions: (1) ATT was enjoined from engaging in any business
other than common carrier communication services and both ATT and WE were enjoined
from manufacturing any telephone equipment of a type not sold to the Bell System com-
panies; (2) both companies were required to grant royalty-free non-exclusive licenses under
all the U.S. patents held at the time by WE, and to provide similar licenses, at reasonable
rates, to all future patents, along with technical information required, to any company
wishing to manufacture telephone equipment. Id.
24. 351 F. Supp. at 1176.
25. Id. at 1171. GTE acquired Leich in 1950 and Theodore Gary and Company in
1955, thereby acquiring 78% of American Electric Co., which was subsequently merged
with Leich. Id.
26. Id., citing ITT, Proposed Findings of Fact (ITT F&F), at 32. GTE later acquired
the remaining shares of AE, which at the time held one-third of Lenkurt, and subsequently,
acquired the balance of the Lenkurt stock. Id.
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It was not until 1964 that the Government instituted suit" to block acquisi-
tion by GTE of the Western Utilities Group.28 But the action was discontinued
for the reason that in view of the unique conditions of the telephone industry and
the telephone equipment industry, where vertical relationships between companies
similar to that involved in this lawsuit exist to a great extent, the Department has
determined that it would be inappropriate, actively, to prosecute this suit against a
single company at this time.29
A no-action letter of similar import was received by ITT when it planned to
acquire the United Telephone Company.30 The court in ITT found that such
voluntary reluctance to bring suit against obvious vertical restraints
make[s] it apparent that when the Department of Justice in 1956 consented to the
continued vertical integration of ATT, by that action it placed itself in a deft stick
from which it became virtually impossible for the Department thereafter to justify
any Clayton § 7 action against any merger, vertical or horizontal, in the independent
telephone market.
ITT as a private attorney general is not so morally or legally inhibited or restrained
by the Department of Justice's or even ITT's own past actions.
Nor is this court.31
The court's obvious disapproval of the Bell policy may well have affected its
choice of relevant product market in the case of GTE.& 2
In determining the relevant market, the court defined it as the non-Bell, or
independent telephone equipment market, and not the telephone equipment
market as a whole. The effect on the broad market, even if the GTE acquisitions
eliminated all other independents, would have been less than nine percent. But the
impact on the sub-market, the independent manufacturers, was potentially 50
percent of the total independent market.a
It was the choice of this limited sub-market, with its far more extensive
impact, which led the court to find violations both of section 1 of the Sherman
27. 351 F. Supp. at 1184-85.
28. See note 15 supra.
29. 351 F. Supp. at 1185, citing Stipulation of Facts, GTE Item 88 (citation omitted).
For a discussion of section 7 violations, and policy considerations relating to them, see 39
Fordham L. Rev. 515 (1971).
30. 351 F. Supp. at 1185, citing Findings of Fact, GTE Item 8.1(n).
31. Id. (footnote omitted).
32. The court further stated: "Within the purview of the philosophy underlying the anti-
trust acts, the only 'unique circumstances in the telephone and telephone equipment industries'
revolve around 'unique' internal restraints which the Department of Justice has placed upon
itself by and because of the Bell Consent Decree." Id. at 1185-86.
33. Id. at 1174-77. Further, there were questions of geographic market delineation. Even
though the Canadian market, the Puerto Rican market, the Virgin Islands market, and the
U.S market were all directly involved in the litigation (due to counterclaims and additional
complaints), and even though a huge foreign market existed, in which GTE vs a less than
powerful factor, the court limited the geographical impact area to the 50 United States.
Id. at 1174 & n-44.
1973]
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Act 34 and section 7 of the Clayton Act.8" Having decided that such violations
existed, the court then confronted the question of remedy.
B. The Remedy
ITT's suit asked for eight specific remedies under Clayton Act section 16:
(1) divestiture by GTE of manufacturing subsidiaries; (2) divestiture by GTE
of all phone operating companies acquired after 1950; (3) a mandatory injunc-
tion requiring that GTE purchase its phone equipment from manufacturers other
than AE and its subsidiary, Lenkurt; (4) a decree restricting the expansion
of AE (and Lenkurt) production facilities; (5) an injunction ordering GTE to
employ non-discriminatory purchasing practices; (6) an injunction prohibiting
future acquisitions by GTE; (7) a Bell-decree type royalty-free compulsory
licensing of all AE's (and Lenkurt's) patents and necessary technical informa-
tion on all products previously purchased in quantity, or on those standard in
GTE telephone companies; (8) attorney's fees.80
Of the many defenses raised by GTE during the six-year pendency of the
action, most have little bearing on the availability of private divestiture. 87 To
this point, however, the GTE argument was two-fold: first, that ITT lacked
standing, as a private party, to sue for divestiture; second, that the court had
no power to grant divestiture at the instance of a private plaintiff.
The first argument is grounded in GTE's contention that the power to sue
for any injunctive relief (under section 16 of the Clayton Act)88 is based, for
the private party, on the legal right established by section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 9 the treble-damage provision. In a prior proceeding by ITT to strike
GTE's affirmative defenses, 40 the court discussed the relation between the two
sections and the source of plaintiff's rights under section 16. GTE contended
that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to treble-damage actions
barred ITT's equitable claim since the GTE acquisitions were, in all but a few
cases, more than four years old. The court disagreed, finding that the legis-
lative history of the Clayton Act did not support the conclusion that the equi-
34. As to the section 1 violation, the court stated: "GTE, acting in concert with ...
Leich, AE, Lenkurt and all of the various GTE telephone operating companies, have since
at least 1950, by reason of their agreements to merge and consolidate, their mergers and
consolidations, and their subsequent actions and conduct in effectively foreclosing the market
for telephone equipment represented by the GTE telephone operating companies, constituted
a continuing combination in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce in the
production and sale of telephone equipment to independent telephone operating companies
in the U.S. in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1198 (footnote omitted).
35. As to the section 7 claim, the court found that "GTE's entire horizontal and vertical
acquisition program, has the reasonably probable effect of substantially lessening competi-
tion .. . ." Id.
36. Id. at 1203.
37. Among other defenses raised were laches, unclean hands, immunity under state action,
and lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the court. See id. at 1162-64.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). See also 351 F. Supp. at 1163-64.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1S (1970).
40. ITT v. GTE, 296 F. Supp. 920 (D. Hawaii 1969).
[Vol. 41
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table right in section 16 flowed from the private legal right granted in section
4.41 The court pointed out that treble damages were originally granted under the
Sherman Act, wherein no equitable right was available to the private plaintiff,
and that Clayton Act section 4 reenacted the Sherman Act provision. Section
16 of the Clayton Act provided a separate, equitable right, and therefore, the
statute of limitations on the legal right in section 4 of the Clayton Act is in-
applicable to section 16 equitable claims .4  The court noted that: "The two
sections expressly create wholly independent remedies, in strikingly similar lan-
guage. A litigant may pull either trigger of his shotgun independently, or, at
his option, he may shoot both barrels together."4
GTE further contended that the court had no power to decree divestiture
under section 16, basing its argument on clear precedent, in early cases, which
had stated, albeit largely in dicta, that such a remedy did not exist for private
plaintiffs," and relying heavily on the fact that no court had ever granted such
a remedy, although a few courts have intimated its existence.45 These conten-
tions were not accepted for several reasons. The court found that the legislative
history of section 16 provided concrete support for its granting of such relief.40
Further support for this reasoning was gained from the fact that despite no
41. Id. at 921-23. For a discussion of the legislative background and interrelation of the
sections, see text accompanying notes 96-106 infra.
42. 296 F. Supp. at 923.
43. Id. After trial, GTE interposed a defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, basing the argument on the common carrier exception to section 16.
351 F. Supp. at 1163-68. The exception reads as follows: "Provided, That nothing herein
contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except
the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier
subject to the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen
hundred and eighty-seven in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision,
or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission." Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (1970) (emphasis omitted). GTE reasoned that since it is a common carrier, only the
ICC, and by extension, the FCC, could prosecute. The court disagreed, based on legislative
history, and upheld the right of the "private attorney general" to seek injunctive relief
against GTE. 351 F. Supp. at 1163. Thus, the court found that section 16 made at least
some injunctive relief available to ITT.
GTE also claimed at this time that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The
court answered by quoting from General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 228,
230-31 (1926): "By jurisdiction we mean power to entertain the suit, consider the merits
and render a binding decision thereon; and by merits we mean the various elements which
enter into or qualify the plaintiff's right to the relief sought. There may be jurisdiction
and yet an absence of merits . . . as where the plaintiff seeks preventive relief against a
threatened violation of law of which he has no right to complain, either because it will not
injure him or because the right to invoke such relief is lodged exclusively in an agency
charged with the duty of representing the public in the matter.... If it be resolved against
him, the appropriate decree is a dismissal for want of merits, not for want of jurisdiction."
351 F. Supp. at 1163.
44. See notes 153-66 infra and accompanying text.
45. 351 F. Supp. at 1203-04.
46. Id. at 1204-05.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
express mention of divestiture in section 15 of the Clayton Act,47 which pro-
vides for injunctive remedy in actions by the Justice Department, the remedy
of divestiture has been readily accepted in Government suits. 48
As to those cases which had held "by way of bare holding, dictum, or pro-
nunciamento" 49 that such a remedy was unavailable,5" the court found that argu-
ments advanced therein had no basis or were mere repetitions of a chance re-
mark in Continental Securities Co. v. Michigan Central Railroad Co."' Rather,
attention was turned to more recent cases that had assumed the availability of
divestiture as a private remedy, though never actually granting that form of
relief. 52 After noting that section 16 requires proof of threatened loss or damage
to the plaintiff,53 the court ruled that the private divestiture and mandatory
injunctive remedies available to the Government are likewise available to the
private plaintiff. In so holding the court stated:
There is no question that actions seeking divestiture, whether by public or private
attorneys general, are dangerous to the defending corporations, and GTE argues that
only the government should be entitled to request such relief because of its more
objective, less selfish posture. This position dearly runs counter to the Court's admoni-
tion in Perma Life Mufflers, that 'the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by
insuring that the private action will be an everpresent threat to deter anyone con-
templating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.'54
III. THE Calnetics CASE
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc." was decided independently
of the ITT case, and likewise granted divestiture at the instance of a private
plaintiff.
Calnetics, a manufacturer of small-engine auto air conditioners, brought an
action against Volkswagen of America ("VWoA"), Volkswagen Pacific, Inc.
("VPI"), an independent Volkswagen distributor, and Volkswagen Products,
Inc. ("VPC"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of VWoA engaged in the manufac-
ture of air conditioners for Volkswagen cars. The action charged violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, and
sought damages and injunctive relief in the form of divestiture of VPC by
VWoA. The court severed the Sherman Act claims, reserving these alleged viola-
tions for later trial, and proceeded to trial on the section 7 violation.
Plaintiff's claim was based on the following facts: In 1967, Calnetics entered
47. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970).
48. See text accompanying notes 101-29 infra.
49. 351 F. Supp. at 1204 (footnotes omitted).
50. See text accompanying notes 153-68 infra.
51. 351 F. Supp. at 1205, citing Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d
378, 379 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927); see text accompanying note 1
supra; notes 161-63 infra.
52. See text accompanying notes 169-90 infra.
53. 351 F. Supp. at 1204-05.
54. Id. at 1209 (citation omitted).
55. 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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the small car air conditioner field, at which time two firms held field dominance,
one of which was Delanair, with an 85.5 percent market share. The other, DPD,
had 13A percent of the market. By 1969, Delanair's share had dropped to 52.4
percent, DPD had increased to 32.5 percent, Calnetics held 8.9 percent. Late in
1969, VWoA acquired Delanair, changing its name to rPC. In 1971, VPC's
market share had risen to 71 percent, while DPD had fallen to 26 percent and
Calnetics to .4 percent. 56 Calnetics brought the action claiming that the ac-
quisition by VWoA of VPC violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.57
At the outset, VWoA claimed that Calnetics lacked standing to sue either
for damages or for injunctive relief for violation of section 7.58 The court, while
admitting that "defendants have, with some modicum of success, convinced
courts that there exists no private right to maintain an action for damages suf-
fered or equitable relief required from alleged violation of Section 7,1159 found
this "neither persuasive nor compelling." 0 After reviewing early cases which
indicated that such remedies did not exist,61 the court concentrated on recent
decisions that had indicated that an action for damages exists under section 7,
and that injunctive relief was likewise available. 2 As to injunctive relief, the
court found the language of section 16 of the Clayton Act dispositive in itself.
The "clear language of [section 16] that 'any person . . . shall be entitled to
sue for and have injunctive relief' "3 makes obvious the availability of such
relief. Following Kiriluira v. Bendix Corp.,0 the court also found that Congress
dearly had intended section 4 treble damage actions for section 7 violations.
"Reading the clear language of Sections 4 ... and 16... compels the conclu-
sion that Calnetics is properly before the Court in its damage claims and its
request for injunctive relief required by the acquisition of Delanair .... "0
56. Id. at 610-14, 620.
57. Section 7 provides in pertinent part: '"No corporation engaged in commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital...
of another corporation . . . where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
58. VWoA also urged the "failing company" defense. VWoA claimed that Delanair was
a failing company and thus, under International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930), the
merger could survive. The court found that Delanair could not meet the criteria for such
exception; it had a retained earning surplus and had settled with creditors, plus it had a
capable, though unwilling, parent company in the wings. 348 F. Supp. at 622.
59. 348 F. Supp. at 615.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 615-16, citing Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 Fad 725
(8th Cir. 1964); Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926),
cert. denied, 274 US. 741 (1927); American Comm'l Barge Line Co. v. Eastern Gas & Fuel
Assocs., 204 F. Supp. 451 (SMD. Ohio 1962).
62. Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964),
aft'd, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969).
63. 348 F. Supp. at 615.
64. 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969).
65. 348 F. Supp. at 616 (citations omitted).
1973]
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The court drew distinctions between a plaintiff seeking damages and a plain-
tiff seeking an injunction, on grounds both of standing and position in request-
ing the remedies. While the standard for damage relief is actual damages, proven
to be closely causally connected to the alleged antitrust violation, the requisite
burden of proof for injunctive relief is only that of prospective injury for the
private plaintiff. "Injunction and/or divestiture are concerned with the future.
Actual present damage need not be shown as the predicate for such relief."0 0
Indeed, the court found in Calnetics that plaintiff had failed to show sufficient
causal connection to his market loss to satisfy the requirements for treble dam-
ages. However, the court also found, based on the market trends shown, a
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, stating: "A dispassionate review of
these facts leads to the inevitable conclusion that this acquisition is monopoly
in its incipiency."67
With respect to the divestiture relief prayed for, the court noted that a plain-
tiff's position is vastly different when suing under section 16 for injunctive
relief. "A case for divestiture is one in which a single competitor is but one
element in the mosaic of competition. Divestiture affects all of the competitors
in the marketplace and so all must be considered .. . 2,68 In this way the court
found that "a Section 7 divestiture plaintiff acts somewhat as a Rule 23 class
representative and need not satisfy the requirement of 'impact' in its classical
antitrust definition."0 9
Interestingly, the court in Calnetics, once it had found standing to sue for
equitable relief, merely assumed the availability of divestiture. Beyond a quote
from a single case, cited in support of the proposition that damage relief is
available,7 0 there is essentially no discussion of the availability of divestiture
as opposed to other injunctive relief. The court, however, granted divestiture
to Calnetics stating: "Armed with the confidence that relief in an antitrust
case must be effective to redress the violation and to restore competition the
Court now calls upon the parties to present plans for accomplishing the relief
granted.171
While the Calnetics decision is a strong statement for the availability of
66. Id. at 617, citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
It should be noted that at least one commentator has drawn a possible distinction between
actions for divestiture by the acquired company where the acquisition is In violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), and actions for divestiture by com-
petitors who are threatened by an illegal acquisition. See Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits
Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 48 Texas L. Rev. 54 (1969).
67. 348 F. Supp. at 621.
68. Id. at 620.
69. Id.
70. "'... While Clayton § 7 permits private injunctive and divestiture actions . ..no
private action for treble damages accrues from a Clayton § 7 acquisition. . . ."' Id. at 616
(emphasis deleted), quoting Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp.
705, 717 (D. Hawaii 1964), aff'd, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086
(1969).
71. 348 F. Supp. at 623 (footnote omitted).
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private remedies, both in general and for divestiture, it is weakened by its choice
of relevant market area. VWoA, of course, urged that the entire car air condi-
tioning market be selected, which would have made Calnetics' share so minimal
as to be insignificant. Since Calnetics' air conditioners could beused, with minor
modifications, in any small engine car, this would have seemed the obvious
relevant market choice. However, the court defined the market as the Volks-
wagen air conditioner market, using very questionable logic. 2 This alone could
provide grounds for reversal on appeal.
The Calnetics decision stands as a second case in which private divestiture
has been decreed. Although perhaps not the perfect case for establishing a doc-
trine of private divestiture, since Calnetics had such slight market power and
could show prospective injury only to the slightest degree, the case does stand
as support for the proposition that private divestiture is indeed available.
The real question, however, is: Is such a conclusion justified? A detailed
examination of the legislative history and case law surrounding actions for
divestiture, and private actions in particular, must form the basis for any rea-
sonable answer.
IV. DrvEsTiTuEp-THE REmDY
Divestiture has only recently become a major remedy in the antitrust area.
Prior to 1955, the remedy was rarely invoked, a policy of extreme judicial re-
straint having surrounded its use.73 In one Supreme Court opinion of that era
it was announced: "[D]ivestiture is a remedy to restore competition and not
to punish those who restrain trade, it is not to be used indiscriminately, without
regard to the type of violation or whether other effective methods, less harsh,
are available." 74
72. The court rejected the choice of the small-engine auto air conditioner market on the
ground that market must be determined by the product sold in the marketplace, rather than
on the production capability of the producer. The court found that VWoA misread United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), with respect to interchangeability of
manufacturing facilities and its effect on market determination, holding that the basis of
the Supreme Court's decision in Columbia involved interchangeability of products. The court
found that small-engine auto air conditioners were not interchangeable with Volkswagen air
conditioners despite the fact that only minimal modifications were required to produce air
conditioners for other small-engine cars. In so holding the court stated: "To hold otherwise
would mean that a producer who decides to sell automobile air conditioners but is capable,
with little or no plant changes, of producing refrigerator compressors is measured in the
competitive marketplace by inclusion of refrigerators as part of the relevant product market."
348 F. Supp. at 618. The court made no mention of the difference in degree between the
VWoA argument and the court's analogy, considerably weakening the relevant product
market determination.
73. In 1955, the Attorney General's committee studying the antitrust laws noted that
"over the 60 odd years of Sherman Act history, courts have in only 24 litigated cases entered
decrees requiring divorcement, divestiture or dissolution." Report of the Atty General's
Nat'l Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws 354 (1955).
74. Timaken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 603 (1951). See also
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 109 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
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Since the mid-1950's however, both judicial acceptance and use of divestiture
as a remedy for certain types of antitrust violations have increased markedly,
especially with respect to the anti-merger provision, section 7 of the Clayton
Act.75 This shift in emphasis within the remedial structure may be attributed
largely to a like shift in the type of violation encountered.70 Before examining
this relatively recent response, a brief review of the history and application
of divestiture is warranted.
A. Divestiture in General
In 1879, the first major industrial combination of considerable size, the origi-
nal Standard Oil trust, was formed in Ohio.77 In the following decade, several
other major trusts were created, leading to a general distress over the growth
of corporate power.78 Also in 1879, the United States Supreme Court, in Thomas
v. Railroad Co.,10 declared a lease by one railroad of the rolling stock, road
and buildings of another railroad, without charter authority, void as an ultra
vires act, and against public policy. In response to increasing corporate growth,
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.80 However, the effect of
the Act on corporate combinations was not immediately clear. One commentator
has stated:
In spite (or perhaps because) of the general language of the prohibitions of that
statute against combinations in restraint of trade in the form of trusts or otherwise,
it was not clear in the years immediately following its enactment just how far the
courts would go in interpreting the act as prohbiting the union of two or more firms
under common control by means of the corporate device. 8'
One thing, however, became apparent rather early in the judicial treatment
of the Act: namely, that divestiture was an acceptable remedy.8 2 As early as
75. From 1950 through January 1, 1970, 277 complaints charging section 7 violations
had been filed (173 brought by the Antitrust Division, the remaining 104 by the FTC).
Of these, 137, or 60%, resulted in an order of divestiture. See Pfunder, Plaine and Whittemore,
Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of
the Relief Obtained, 17 Antitrust Bull. 19, 32 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Effectiveness of
Divestiture Relief].
76. See note 9 supra.
77. D. Martin, Mergers and the Clayton Act 4 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Martin].
78. See D. Pegrum, Regulation of Industry 143 (1949).
79. 101 U.S. 71 (1879).
80. Act of July 2, 1890, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (as amended and codified, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1970)).
81. Martin, supra note 77, at 13.
82. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The
Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 Ind. L.J. 1 (1951); Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits Under
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 48 Texas L. Rev. 54 (1969) ; Stigler, Mergers and Preventive
Antitrust Policy, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 176 (1955); Van Cise, Limitations Upon Divestiture,
19 Gee. Wash. L. Rev. 147 (1950); Comment, Aspects of Divestiture as an Antitrust Remedy,
32 Fordham L. Rev. 135 (1963); Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as
a Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 267 (1964).
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1897 mandatory injunctions were available in equitable proceedings.83 Divestiture
was viewed as a form of mandatory injunction, and in 1899 the first judicial
decree of divestiture was handed down.84 The first major Supreme Court deci-
sion dealing with a divestiture situation was Northern Securities Co. v. United
States.85 Northern Securities was a holding company organized by the stock-
holders of the Great Northern Railway and the Northern Pacific Railway, which
had become, in the Court's terms, the "custodian" for more than nine-tenths of
the stock of Northern Pacific, and more than three-quarters of the stock of
Great Northern. The shareholders of both railroads received, on an agreed basis,
shares of Northern Securities in return for their railroad stock. The Court
affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota, which
enjoined the stock in question from being voted by Northern Securities, its
officers, directors, servants or agents. 7 Further, Northern Securities was en-
joined from "'acquiring, or attempting to acquire, further stock of either of the
aforesaid railway companies .... , ",88 The Court also affirmed that part of the
decree which encouraged Northern Securities either to return the stock of the
two railways to the original stockholders, or to assign the railway stock to those
people who were at that time beneficial owners of Northern Securities stock.
In effect, the Court framed a voluntary divestiture by imposing severe limita-
tions upon rights of stockholders of the holding company, and all but requiring
a return to the status quo prior to the initial transfers. While not a formal dis-
solution of the combine, Northern Securities dearly foreshadowed the two major
pre-Clayton Act antitrust decisions, Standard Oil Co. v. United States,00 and
United States v. American Tobacco Co."'
In Standard Oil, the Court set forth its aims in future Sherman Act cases, at
the same time defining a twofold character in the proper application of remedies:
1st. To forbid the doing in the future of acts like those which we have found to have
been done in the past which would be violative of the statute.
2d. The exertion of such measure of relief as will effectually dissolve the combination
83. In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897). "During the first seventy years of federal antitrust
law enforcement, 615 of the 770 civil antitrust cases instituted by the Department of Justice
were pursued to some type of equitable remedy. One hundred thirty-eight of the cases
terminated in injunctive orders following litigation, while the remainder ended in consent
decrees." Flynn, A Survey of Injunctive Relief Under State and Federal Antitrust La ,
1967 Utah L. Rev. 344, 348-49 (footnote omitted). As to the status of divestiture as a
form of injunction see Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc, 240 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
84. United States v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n, 85 F. 252 (N.D. Cal. 1898); see Celler, The
Trial Court's Competence to Pass Upon Divestiture Relief, 10 Antitrust Bull. 693, 697 (1965).
85. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
86. Id. at 321-22.
87. Id. at 355.
88. Id., quoting United States v. Northern Sec. Co., 120 F. 721, 732 (8th Cir. 1903),
aff'd, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
89. 193 U.S. at 355-56, citing United States v. Northern Sec. Co., 120 F. 721, 732 (8th
Cir. 1903), aff'd, 193 US. 197 (1904).
90. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
91. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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found to exist in violation of the statute, and thus neutralize the extension and con-
tinually operating force which the possession of the power unlawfully obtained has
brought and will continue to bring about.0 2
The Government's right to such remedy was grounded upon section 4 of the
Sherman Act.93 The same section was employed to give like relief in the Amenri
can Tobacco case. There, the Court was dealing with a horizontal merger,
achieved through a series of asset acquisitions, 94 rather than stock holding
company transfers. It was not interested in the form of acquisition, but rather
in the combination as a whole, and the purposes and results of the combina-
tion on free trade. Thus, in framing the decree, the Court held:
ist. That the combination in and of itself, as well as each and all of the elements
composing it ... be decreed to be in restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize
and a monopolization within the first and second sections of the [Sherman] Anti.
trust Act.
2d. That the court below, in order to give effective force to our decree in this regard,
be directed to hear the parties ...for the purpose of ascertaining and determining
upon some plan or method of dissolving the combination and of recreating, out of the
elements now composing it, a new condition which shall be honestly in harmony with
and not repugnant to the law.95
Three years later, in 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act. Although
opinion has differed as to the major motivations for the Act,90 the consensus
92. 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911).
93. Id. at 30.
94. The distinction between stock acquisition and asset acquisition became critical with
respect to vertical mergers, and largely precipitated the passage of the Celler-Kefauver
Amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No.
899, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, amending 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)).
Congress, viewing with considerable alarm post-World War II mergers, moved to amend
the Clayton Act to cover a wider range of conglomerate and merged acquisitions and
combinations. See Houghton, Revelation and Paradoxes of Recent Antitrust Decisions, 7
Antitrust Bull. 733, 736 (1962); Comment, Aspects of Divestiture as an Antitrust Remedy,
32 Fordham L. Rev. 135, 137 (1963). Much of this dissatisfaction stemmed from a 1934
Supreme Court decision in which the Court ordered divestiture of illegally held stock, but
ruled that the Act did not apply to "property of a different sort" acquired by direct pur-
chase or otherwise. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 598 (1934); see
Martin, supra note 77, at 118. Thus the Celler-Kefauver Amendments were passed, plugging
the loophole in section 7 of the Clayton Act. In interpreting that amendment, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, stated: "Congress contemplated that
the 1950 amendment . .. would bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations, from pure
stock acquisitions to pure assets acquisitions, within the scope of § 7. Thus, the stock-
acquisition and assets-acquisition provisions, read together, reach mergers, which fit neither
category perfectly but lie somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum." 374 U.S. 321,
342 (1963) (emphasis omitted).
95. 221 U.S. 106, 187 (1911) (emphasis added).
96. See generally Martin, supra note 77, at 20-32, 43, 50-51; H. Seager and C. Gulick, Jr.,
Trust and Corporate Problems 424 (1929); 2 H. Toulmin, Antitrust Laws of the United
States, § 1.3 (1949).
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is that Congress, responding to criticism that the Sherman Act had become in-
effective due to the Supreme Court's enunciation of the "rule of reason,"0
sought to enact "a policy toward combinations more stringent than the Sherman
Act, as it was interpreted at the time."0 8 Debate on the substantive portions of
the bill, and particularly on section 7,99 the anti-merger provision, 00 was lengthy
and complex. 10 1 The result was a statute that dealt with the tendency toward
monopoly, as well as the existence of actual restraint. 10 2 The chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee stated on the floor of the Senate:
It is proposed, without amending the Sherman Antitrust Act... to supplement that
act by denouncing and making unlawful certain trade practices which, while not covered
by that act because not amounting to restraint of commerce or monopoly in them-
selves, yet constitute elements tending ultimately to violations of that act.1 0
Section 15 of the Clayton Act was considered a reenactment of section 4 of
the Sherman Act,'0 4 and hence gave rise to the same "proceedings in equity to
prevent and restrain such violations."'1 5 Although neither provision expressly
authorizes divestiture or dissolution, it is arguable that since Congress, in en-
acting the Clayton Act, had full knowledge of Court interpretation with regard
to the divestiture and dissolution remedies under Sherman Act section 4, and
that since the Clayton Act itself was largely a reaction to Court-made doctrine,
the broad phrasing of Clayton Act section 15 could have been easily limited to
exclude the divestiture remedy, had Congress so desired. Instead, discussion of
97. "[Tlhe standard of reason which had been applied at the common law and in this
country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the [Sherman Act], was
intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case a
particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
98. Martin, supra note 77, at 25.
99. Originally numbered § 8, 38 Stat. 732 (1914).
100. The section then provided in pertinent part: "That no corporation engaged in
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such
acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce
in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.' Ch.
323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
101. Hearing on Trust Legislation Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914).
102. "The principal difference between the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act is that the
former dealt with consummated restraints, whereas the latter sought to reach monopolistic
evils in their incipiency. The Clayton Act provides a different test of liability, since it
prohibits contracts, etc., where the effect may he to substantially lessen competition.' 2
L Toulmin, Antitrust Iaws of the United States, § 1.2 (1949) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
omitted).
103. 51 Cong. Rec. 13,848 (1914).
104. Ch. 647, § 4, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
105. In fact, the language of the two sections [Sherman § 4, Clayton § 15] is identical,
save a service and summons clause at the end of Clayton Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970).
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the remedial aspects of section 15, beyond the very general discussions of in-
junctive relief, was virtually non-existent. Thus, it has always been the tacit
assumption of the courts that divestiture power is available for remedying sec-
tion 7 violations.10 6
Whatever conclusions can be drawn from textual and historical analysis of
the Acts themselves, the courts have uniformly granted divestiture in proper
circumstances. Undoubtedly, the trend has been toward increased use of the
remedy.107
As has been previously stated, judicial restraint characterized the attitude of
the courts toward divestiture in the first forty years following the enactment
of the Clayton Act. Courts generally adopted the view that divestiture was to be
avoided, especially in cases where "violations... can be eliminated by means of
the other provisions of the judgment and . . divestiture . . . is not necessary
to foster competition .... ,,1o1 Several major decisions of the mid-1940's, how-
ever, presaged the future use of the divestiture remedy.
In United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.,'00 the defendant was found to
have conspired to restrain and monopolize trade in the exhibition of motion
pictures. In addition to being restrained from future acquisitions of theatres
without first showing that no unreasonable restraint would result, defendant
was ordered to divest itself of stock of various affiliated corporations.
"Those who violate the Act may not reap the benefits of their violations and
avoid an undoing of their unlawful project on the plea of hardship or incon-
venience. That principle is adequate here to justify divestiture of all interest in
some of the affiliates since their acquisition was part of the fruits of the con-
106. With regard to the availability of divestiture as a remedy, even for the government
under section 15 of the Clayton Act, it has been noted that divestiture is specifically
granted as a remedy for the FTC under section 11 of the Act. Ch. 323, § 11, 38 Stat.
734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970). "[The FTC] shall Issue and cause to
be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
violations, and divest itself of the stock [or other share capital, or assets] held or rid Itself
of the directors chosen contrary to the provisions of sections seven and eight of this Act."
Id. at 735. It has therefore been argued that since such language does not appear In
section 15, divestiture is unavailable as a remedy for the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department. While the courts have never agreed with this premise, the Supreme Court
has specifically denied the claim of the Justice Department that divestiture is required for
section 7 violations. "We reject the Government's argument that the Federal Trade Com-
mission and other administrative agencies charged with the duty of enforcing the statute
are required by § 11 of the Clayton Act to order divestiture whenever they find a violation
of § 7, and that therefore courts acting under § 15 must give the same relief. Even If the
administrative agencies were so limited, a question which we do not decide, Congress
would not be deemed to have restricted the broad remedial powers of courts of equity
without explicit language doing so in terms, or some other strong indication of intent."
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328 n.9 (1961) (citation
omitted).
107. See note 75 supra.
108. United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 871 (D.N.J. 1953).
109. 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
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spiracy."" 0 A new aspect of punitive considerations in divestiture arose in the
"fruits of the venture" theory expounded in Crescent, very much in contradic-
tion of the earlier doctrine that antitrust laws were merely remedial."'
In another of the motion picture monopoly cases, Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.
v. United States," the Court, four years after Crescent, held that an injunction
against future violations was insufficient, and that without divestiture defendants
could "retain the full dividends of their monopolistic practices and profit from the
unlawful restraints of trade which they had inflicted on competitors."113 While
these cases dealt with mergers of a horizontal nature, the Court in the same year
provided similar relief in a vertical merger situation.
In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.," 4 the Justice Department
brought an action against Paramount and other major film producers and dis-
tributors, charging a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize distribution and
exhibition of feature films. Defendants employed a complex system of price fixing
and restraint of competition, including joint ownership of theatres which were
operating as a unit, thus eliminating competition in bidding for films. The district
court found a violation of the Sherman Act, and issued a decree requiring compe-
titive bidding for all feature films, but refused to divest the producers of their
ownership of local theatres.115 On appeal, the Justice Department insisted on
divestiture to break up the vertical integration of production, distribution and
exhibition. The Supreme Court found that the competitive bidding decree re-
quired supervision beyond the reasonable capacity of the courts, and remanded
for consideration of the divestiture remedy, which was eventually granted by the
district court." 6 In Paramount, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that "size is itself an
earmark of monopoly power. For size carries with it an opportunity for abuse." n 7
This remark is of particular interest in terms of a prior Court ruling that size,
in itself, is not an offense." 8 While the two statements are clearly not contra-
dictory, they evidenced a growing concern about monopoly power and the relation
of size of the combination to the necessity of properly drawn remedies.""
Perhaps the greatest impetus to the divestiture trend was the landmark case
of United States v. EJ. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 20-- a notable decision if
110. Id. at 189.
111. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
112. 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
113. Id. at 128.
114. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
115. Id. at 155-56, 170.
116. Id. at 175.
117. Id. at 174.
118. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
119. For the development of the concept of monopoly power and the violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act, see United States v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co,
351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. United Shoe Mfach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mlass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
120. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
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for no other reason than the huge dollar amounts involved.121 In dit Pont, the
Supreme Court used extremely strong language with regard to the proper use of
divestiture as a remedy.' 22 The case dealt with holdings by the du Pont family
and related companies of the stock of General Motors and United States Rubber.
Because of the massive GM holding (63,000,000 shares or 23 percent) by du
Pont, the U.S. Rubber holdings were all but ignored by the Court. In its com-
plaint, filed on June 30, 1949, the Justice Department charged violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
125
After an initial dismissal of the complaint,124 reversed by the Supreme Court and
remanded, 1 25 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois fashioned a decree whereby the voting rights of GM stock would pass
through to du Pont stockholders, and refused to grant the Justice Department's
request for full divestiture.126 The district court found divestiture too harsh;
the market value of the stock in question exceeded $3.5 billion, and the tax costs
alone would have severely depressed the overall market for both GM and du Pont
securities.' 27 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reversed, and ordered full divesti-
ture:
It cannot be gainsaid that complete divestiture is peculiarly appropriate in cases of
stock acquisitions which violate § 7. That statute is specific and 'narrowly directed,'
and it outlaws a particular form of economic control-stock acquisitions which tend
to create a monopoly of any line of commerce. The very words of § 7 suggest that an
undoing of the acquisition is a natural remedy. Divestiture or dissolution has tradi-
tionally been the remedy for Sherman Act violations whose heart is intercorporate
combination and control, and it is reasonable to think immediately of the same remedy
when § 7 of the Clayton Act, which particularizes the Sherman Act standard of
illegality, is involved. Of the very few litigated § 7 cases which have been reported,
most decreed divestiture as a matter of course. Divestiture has been called the most
important of antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure.
121. See note 127 infra.
122. See text accompanying note 128 infra.
123. Amended complaints were filed July 29, 1952 and January 16, 1953. 1970 Merger
Case Digest (15-Dj) at 42. As the initial complaint was filed prior to the 1950 amendment,
original Clayton section 7 applied, not section 7 as amended.
124. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill.
1954), rev'd, 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
125. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
126. United States v. EI. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. 111 1959),
modified, 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
127. "In 1961, when the Supreme Court ordered complete divestiture of Du [sic)
Pont's sixty-three million shares of General Motors stock, the existing law would have
taxed such distributed stock as ordinary income . .. ranging from sixteen to eighty-seven
per cent on the full market value of the stock received. Mass selling of both Du Pont
and General Motors stock would have resulted from some investors' seeking to avoid
paying the tax and from others being forced to liquidate part of their holdings In order
to pay the income tax on the balance, with a resultant depression of market prices and a
loss to stockholders of both companies running to several billion dollars." Comment, Aspects




It should always be in the forefront of a court's mind when a violation of § 7 has
been found.128
Thus, in du Pont, the Court made divestiture the preferred remedy for violation
of the merger laws, and since that case, divestiture has been much more frequently
ordered.129
Du Pont, therefore, had the effect of removing much of the judicial restraint
surrounding the use of divestiture, and placing it in the forefront of antitrust
remedies.
B. Private Divestiture Relief
There is little question that private injunctive relief is available under the
Clayton Act. Section 16130 specifically provides, in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief... against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws, including sections [2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Act] when and under the same conditions
and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss
or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such pro-
ceedings .... 131
The salient inquiry of this Comment is the nature of equitable relief that may
issue for violation of the Act. The usual private remedy for injuries caused by
antitrust violations has been under the treble-damage provision of the Clayton
Act, section 4,-32 which provides that any person whose business or personal
property is injured may sue in the district court for treble his damages, plus costs
and attorney's fees.1 33 Situations arise, however, where damage actions, even
repeated actions under section 4, are inadequate to repair the wrong.'4
Two major situations under Clayton Act section 7 may conceivably give rise to
an injunctive suit under section 16. The first is where a plaintiff is the party
whose stock is being or has been acquired in violation of the anti-merger pro-
visions of the Act; the second occurs where an illegal merger or acquisition has
128. 366 US. at 328-31 (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
129. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (holding an implied divestiture
power in the Civil Aeronautics Board); Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371
US. 115 (1962) (holding that the ICC had implied divestiture power); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (first major exposition under amended Clayton
Act § 7).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 16,
38 Stat. 737).
131. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
133. Id.
134. See Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act,
48 Texas L. Rev. 54, 81-83 (1969); Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation




injured, or threatens to injure a competitor. 135 The many problems surrounding
the granting of divestiture in such cases may be divided into three major areas:
(1) availability and type of remedy granted under section 16; (2) standing
required of the private party; (3) policy considerations affecting the equity
power of the courts and judicial discretion.
1. Availability of the Injunctive Remedy
The legislative history of section 16 is far from enlightening. Little attention
was paid to that section of the Act, inquiry having been focused on the provisions
of section 7 and the other substantive sections. 3 0 However, the House of Repre-
sentatives commentary to section 16, after setting out the pertinent text of the
statute, stated:
Under section 7 of the [Sherman Act], a person injured in his business and property
by corporations or combinations acting in violation of the Sherman antitrust law, may
recover loss and damage for such wrongful act. There is, however, no provision in
the existing law authorizing a person, firm, corporation, or association to enjoin
threatened loss or damage to his business or property by the commission of such
unlawful acts, and the purpose of this section is to remedy such defect in the law.137
However, neither the House nor a parallel Senate report'31 define what is meant
by "injunctive relief" nor limit the scope of such relief.
2. Type of Equitable Remedy Available
Argument regarding private suits for divestiture has centered on the avail-
ability of mandatory injunction, and the availability of divestiture itself. The
early cases, Standard Oil'89 and American Tobacco, 40 used section 4 of the
Sherman Act to achieve dissolution, closely akin to divestiture. 141 While there
135. A third possibility has recently come to light: where a private party Is bringing
action for treble damages and divestiture arising from a loss of employment caused by
what is alleged to be a merger in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the
Clayton Act. See Brief for Appellees at 2-3, Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. ff 74,298 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1973).
136. See Martin, supra note 77, at 30-43.
137. H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1914).
138. S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1914).
139. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
140. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
141. "Although distinctions may be made between the remedies of dissolution, divorce-
ment, and divestiture, the term divestiture is broad enough to cover the other two.
Divestiture refers to divesting a defendant of property, securities, or other assets; divorce-
ment applies to the effect of a decree ordering particular types of divestiture and is
especially applicable to vertically integrated organizations; dissolution refers to any situ-
ation where the dissolving of an illegal combination is involved, including the dissolution
of such combinations by divestiture and divorcement." Note, Availability of Divestiture
in Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 Minn.
L. Rev. 267, 270 n.21 (1964) (citing S. Oppenheim, Cases on Federal Anti-trust Laws
885 (1948), and Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: the Pyrrhic Victories of
Antitrust, 27 Ind. L.J. 1 (1951)).
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may have been slight distinctions between dissolution and divestiture at the time
of the passage of the Clayton Act, there is little question that the legislators were
aware of the use of equity power to achieve the effect of divestiture. They were
involved in a supplementary antitrust codification intended to bring the threat of
violations under control;4' they were fully aware of the use of section 4 of the
Sherman Act; 143 and they enacted section 15 of the Clayton Act-for all intents
and purposes an identical copy of Sherman Act section 4.1" While the leading
cases phrased decrees negatively, 145 mandatory injunctions were dearly available
in courts of equity at the time of enactment. 40 Section 15 was intended to
extend the availability of that relief to remedy violations of the Clayton Act
provisions. In pertinent part, section 15 gave the government power to "institute
proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings
may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violations
shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited."'47
When compared with section 16's language--"sue for and have injunctive
relief"- 48 -only two analyses are possible. Since the government is empowered to
sue for divestiture, either the phrase "or otherwise prohibited" stands for divesti-
ture, dissolution, and settlement decrees short of restraining orders negatively
phrased, or, as most commentators have observed, there is no more basis to imply
a divestiture remedy from section 15 than there is from section 16.149 It seems
far more logical to conclude that such remedies are included and contemplated
both in section 15, by extension from the history of Sherman Act section 4, and
in section 16, the private corollary to section 15.
While it is true that in committee hearings on section 16, one member and one
witness, Louis D. Brandeis, were opposed to private suits for dissolution,1 0
debate on the floor of Congress shows a somewhat different picture. The limited
debate on section 16 centered on the "enjoining" of unlawful acts which are
The Supreme Court has stated recently that no distinction is to be drawn between
dissolution and divestiture. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,
330 n.11 (1961); Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act,
48 Texas L. Rev. 54, 73-74 (1969).
142. See Martin, supra note 77, at 20-32. See also text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
143. The 1911 dissolution cases were extremely well known and carefully studied. In
the 1914 House hearings on trust legislation, the record was filled with discussion of the
cases. See, e.g., Statement of Hon. Augustus 0. Stanley, Hearings on Trust Legislation
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 65-107 (1914); Statement
of Felix H. Levy, Esq., id. at 231-76; Statement of Louis D. Brandeis, id. at 637-95. It
is simply unreasonable to suppose that the Clayton Act was enacted with no reference to
the past history that accompanied these major decisions.
144. See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
145. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1911).
146. See, e.g., In re Lennon, 166 US. 548 (1897).
147. Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970) (emphasis added).
148. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
149. See sources cited at note 82 supra.
150. Hearings on Trust Legislation Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. at 649-50, 842 (1914).
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harmful to the business of private individuals.' 5 ' However, Senator Shields,
explaining the bill, noted that "[s]ection [16] authorizes persons and corpora-
tions to bring suits in equity against those violating the antitrust laws in all
things, as section 4 of the Sherman law authorizes the government to do so."'' 62
Thus, from the legislative history and textual interpretation, as well as from
the notable failure of Congress to define or even indicate limits of remedy or
scope of power, one may fairly conclude that divestiture, or at least dissolution
under the 1914 understanding of the term, was available under section 16. The
courts, however, failed to see the legislative intent in this light.
3. Case Law Interpretation of Private Remedy
Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act, courts had begun to fashion a policy
with respect to private suits in antitrust. The Supreme Court established the
Sherman Act rule for injunctive relief in 1904, in Minnesota v. Northern
Securities Co.153 There, the State of Minnesota sought to enjoin the combined
operation of the Northern Pacific Railway and the Great Northern Railway
within the state. The Court decided that the state had suffered no "direct or
special injury"' 54 and was suing for a general common injury to every landowner,
an action which would not lie under the Sherman Act. Thus, it upheld denial of
the injunction, stating:
We do not think that Congress contemplated any such methods for the enforcement
of the Anti-Trust Act. We cannot suppose it was intended that the enforcement of
the act should depend in any degree upon original suits in equity instituted by the
States or by individuals to prevent violations of its provisions. . . . Possibly the
thought of Congress was that by such a limitation upon suits in equity of a general
nature to restrain violations of the act . . . the general business of the country . . .
would not be needlessly disturbed by suits brought, on all sides and in every direction,
to accomplish improper or speculative purposes.'5 5
In 1917, in a suit initiated prior to passage of the Clayton Act, the Court
made it clear that the special or general injury distinction was not the gravamen
of its holding in Minnesota v. Northern. The majority of the Court, over strong
dissent, held that a private party could not maintain a suit for injunction under
the Sherman Act, regardless of the nature of the injury claimed.' 50
One year later, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
in the case of Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co.,'" distinguished preventive relief
under section 16 from relief of effects of a consummated act, and held that the
Clayton Act authorized injunction against "threatened loss or damage" holding
those terms to mean threatened conduct, and considering consummated conduct
151. 51 Cong. Rec. 15,943 & 16,319 (1914).
152. Id. at 14,215 (emphasis added).
153. 194 U.S. 48 (1904).
154. Id. at 70.
155. Id. at 70-71.
156. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917).
157. 250 F. 292 (D.NJ. 1918).
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beyond the scope of the Clayton Act injunctive provision.158 This problem was to
arise again and again with regard to private suits in antitrust, the courts stating,
largely in dictum, that preliminary injunctive relief was envisioned in Clayton
Act section 16, but not reforming, dissolving or divesting relief.
Prior to 1972, the cases addressed the question of private divestiture only
incidentally. No court had ever granted divestiture relief to a private plaintiff-
but neither had any court denied such relief, save in dictum or accompanying
other ruling of law. Some earlier cases, however, were quite strong in their views
of the private remedy.
In the Southern District of New York, destined to be a prime battleground for
resolving the private action doctrine, Judge Learned Hand set the first major
precedent with a single statement, in dictum, in Graves v. Cambria Steel Co.2r9
After finding that the prayed-for relief was not against threatened loss or damage
under the statute, Hand went on to state:
The purpose of section 16 of the Clayton Act certainly was to fill a hiatus left in the
Sherman Act, under which the courts had held that private suits, as distinct from
private actions, did not lie....
The suit at bar, whatever else it is, is not a suit for an injunction; indeed, it is
really a suit for the dissolution of a monopoly pro tanto. I cannot suppose that any
one would argue that a private suit for dissolution would lie under section 16 of the
Clayton Act.160
It should be noted that while the Venner court and the Graves court both
found "threatened loss or damage" to mean threatened conduct, the real implica-
tion of the phrase is far wider. Would one suppose, for example, that a party
directly affected by an anti-competitive merger would be threatened with loss
prior to the merger, but no longer threatened after the merger took place? Later
courts began to look upon such anti-competitive action as a continuing threat,
thus bringing it under the language of the Act. In theory, however, the threat
should be considered present as long as the anti-competitive violation is present,
for it is the loss that is continuing, and therefore, "consummated" acts should
be just as much a threat of loss or damage (apart from actual loss) as are
threatened acts that could cause such loss.
In the celebrated case of Continental Securities Co. v. Michigan Central Rail-
road Co.,'61 a complex railroad acquisition resulted in Continental, a minority
stockholder of Michigan Central, suing the newly consolidated New York
Central, among others, for a fraud that benefited a Michigan Central com-
158. "The suits covered by [Section 161 are limited to those seeking preventative
relief; i.e., injunction 'against threatened loss or damage.' No other equitable suits, at the
instance of private parties are expressly authorized by the Clayton Act; and, as the relief
sought in the ... bill is not of a preventative character but to annul a consummated
transaction, none of the venue provisions of the Sherman or Clayton Acts is available to
him under that bilL" Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
159. 298 F. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
160. Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
161. 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 US. 741 (1926).
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petitor. 162 The court first held that there was no fraud; it further ruled that since
the holdings of stock had been substantially the same in 1903, when Continental
purchased the securities (eleven years earlier), Continental could not be heard
to complain in a court of equity. The court, however, extended itself to establish
an additional ground: "The main remedy sought is dissolution of the combina-
tion. Section 16 never has been held to reach such a case. The result sought is
practically the same as would be asked for in a suit by the Attorney General." 103
Two aspects are of interest here: first, the statement is purely dictum, and
thus expresses, as had prior dicta, a recognizable fear in the courts of confronting
the problems involved with private divestiture suits; second, and perhaps more
importantly, the source for the rule of law is one frequently invoked by courts
which hold against private divestiture availability-a reverse stare decisis-a
stare non decisis-that such remedy has never been granted before.
Such rigid adherence to past dicta is somewhat less convincing than normal
stare decisis logic. Where mere statements by courts, in passing, are quoted time
after time to establish the only ground for denial of a type of remedy, the courts
are expressing a definite reluctance on policy grounds to allow such a remedy. In
this case, Continental Securities has formed the basis in dictum for much of the
anti-divestiture reasoning in private actions.
Several other cases followed the Continental theory.0 4 In Westor Theatres v.
Warner Bros. Pictures,165 the court returned to the preventive injunction theory.
There, the plaintiff sued for treble damages, as well as various forms of injunctive
relief including orders of dissolution. In denying a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint, the court stated: "The plaintiff is entitled only to preventative relief
against acts threatening loss or damage to himself and dissolution of a consum-
mated transaction is not within the intendment of the Section providing a private
remedy."166
In 1945, the Supreme Court took a large step toward a broader interpretation
of section 16 in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.10 7 In that case, plaintiff
charged that anti-competitive and arbitrary rates had been fixed to and from the
State of Georgia. After ruling, first, that the ICC did not have exclusive standing
to sue for the injunctive relief sought, and after deeming Georgia a "person"
for the purposes of section 16, the Court stated:
Indeed, so long as the collaboration which exists exceeds lawful limits and continues
in operation, the only effective remedy lies in dissolving the combination or in con-
162. All three railroads were controlled by the Vanderbilt family prior to the consolida-
tion which brought both Michigan railroads under the control of the New York Central.
Id. at 379.
163. Id.
164. See F.A.D. Andrea, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 14 F. Supp. 226 (D. Del.
1936), aff'd, 88 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 681 (1937); See also Connecticut
Tel. & Elec. Co. v. Automotive Equip. Co., 14 F.2d 957 (D.N.J. 1926), cert. denied,
275 U.S. 574 (1927).
165. 41 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.J. 1941).
166. Id. at 763 (footnote omitted).
167. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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fining it within legitimate boundaries. . . Dissolution of illegal combinations or a
restriction of their conduct to lawful channels is a conventional form of relief accorded
in anti-trust suits.. . .And no adequate or effective remedy other than this suit is
suggested which Georgia can employ to eliminate... the unlawful conspiracy alleged
to exist here.168
Although the case involved Sherman Act violations, admittedly different from
threatened losses under the Clayton Act, the broadening of availability under
section 16 formed the rationale for a decision in the Southern District of New
York that effectively clouded the precedential history of private action for di-
vestiture for over twenty years.
4. Modem Case Interpretation
In 1948, a large group of motion picture theater operators brought suit in
Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publihers
("ASCAP"), 1 6 for damages and injunctive relief. ASCAP held the performing
rights of the copyrighted musical compositions created by ASCAP members.
Motion picture producers were licensed to use music, the performance rights to
which were held by ASCAP, and were required to obtain licenses from each
motion picture theater which would exhibit the film. The court, after finding
that ASCAP was a monopoly within section 2 of the Sherman Act, and reciting
numerous antitrust violations, denied plaintiffs' request for damages, but ordered
that ASCAP divest itself of the rights to the compositions, and assign such public
performance rights to the owners of the copyright on each composition. °70 Thus,
a private party prevailed in an injunctive divestiture action. However, the court,
in hearing motions to amend findings of fact, reconsidered its order, and changed
its divestiture decree. 7 In explanation of its revised decree, the court, which
had reached a reasonably clear conclusion, considerably clouded the issue of its
authority:
[D]oubt... has been cast upon the Court's power in a private suit under the anti-
trust laws to direct a divestiture, even though its purpose is to break up an illegal
combination and monopoly, such as the association or entity known as ASCAP. As
to the last point, the recent case of State of Georgia v. Pensylvania R.R. indicates
that the collusive practices of illegal combinations may be effectively enjoined even
though the effect of the injunction may be to dissolve the illegal combination or restrict
its conduct to lawful channels.172
168. Id. at 461-62.
169. 80 F. Supp. 900, modifying 80 F. Supp. 888 (SM.N.Y. 1948).
170. Id. at 900 n.2.
171. "Instead of requiring ASCAP to divest itself of the picture performing rights of
musical compositions and to assign those rights to the owners of the copyright of the
musical compositions, the Court will substitute a provision restraining ASCAP from
attempting directly or indirectly to enforce the motion picture performing rights ... and
a provision restraining ASCAP's members, while they continue as members of ASCAP, from
attempting either directly or indirectly to enforce against anyone the motion picture perform-
ing rights of any musical composition of which they have granted the motion picture
synchronization rights to the motion picture producer." Id. at 903.
172. Id. (citation omitted).
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It is strange that the court doubted its power to decree divestiture, while
citing a Supreme Court decision that supported such a decree. This apparent
contradiction left an impression of indecision upon the courts deciding subsequent
private injunctive suits.
In Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 73 the court returned
to the consummated act distinction in a suit between stockholders each of whom
owned 50 percent of a theatre corporation: plaintiff managed the operation of the
theater while defendant supplied the films. Plaintiff sued for treble damages and
injunctive relief, based on an alleged conspiracy. The injunction sought the
surrender of stock held by defendant, and hence was more a confiscatory than
a divestiture proceeding. The court nonetheless stated: "Nor can the surrender
•.. be ordered in a private right of action under [section 16] which relates to
injunctive relief. Relief of the type plaintiff is seeking is reserved for the govern-
ment in anti-trust suits."' 74 The court cited Alden-Rochelle's modified decree
as precedent. It then proceeded to outline other grounds for denial of the injunc-
tive remedy, among them possible interference with government obtained decrees.
Thus, in supporting the presumed Alden-Rochelle rationale, in an inapposite
case' 76 this court once again added to the general confusion surrounding the
private remedy.
A shift of emphasis, however, may be observed in the decision of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Schrader v.
National Screen Service Corp.'7 6 Plaintiff distributed motion picture posters,
while defendant was a huge motion picture accessory manufacturer and dis-
tributor. Defendant was found to have an illegal monopoly. The court, comment-
ing upon plaintiff's request for a divestiture decree, stated:
Without going into the question of the exact extent of the power of the Court to do
this, it has come to be generally recognized that considerations of policy are against
decreeing divestiture or the complete destruction of a nationwide business at the suit
of an individual in a private action under the antitrust laws, particular [sic] where
that would have a far-reaching and possibly adverse effect upon interests not proved
to have participated. 177
The court cited no sources for its conclusion that divestiture could not be
granted, but rested its ruling on public policy grounds, a departure from previous
legislative intent-oriented arguments. It is also notable that the court did not rule
out the possibility of divestiture under proper circumstances, but merely declared
a judicial policy against the remedy.
Two years after Schrader, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was confronted with another private divestiture suit. There, five years
173. 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cr.
1953).
174. Id. at 542.
175. Here, each party owned 50% of the shares, which action never could have allowed
surrender of shares on equitable grounds, thus vesting plaintiff with total ownership of
the corporation on one-half contribution.
176. 1955 Trade Cas. J 68,217 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
177. Id. at 71,009 (emphasis added).
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after Fanchon & Marco, the court fashioned an entirely different rationale. In
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 78 the plaintiff sued
for relief under section 16, alleging that defendant had acquired 23 percent of
plaintiff's stock. The court found a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, and
enjoined defendant from directly or indirectly voting any shares of plaintiff's
stock, or from acquiring representation on plaintiff's board of directors. As to
divestiture of the stock, the court stated: "So much of the complaint as seeks a
decree directing the defendant to divest itself of stock of the plaintiff company
which it may now own is not granted in view of the fact that issuance of the
injunction as hereinabove directed constitutes an appropriate remedy so that
divestiture is not necessary."' 79 Thus, the dicta had begun to run in the other
direction. The court in American Crystal dearly implied that divestiture could
have been granted, but that the circumstances did not warrant so drastic a
remedy. The court, however, gave no more support for this proposition than had
other courts speaking in dicta the opposite way.
Although American Crystal may be said to have opened the door to the private
divestiture suit, the Southern District of New York, in the same year, denied such
a remedy in Fein v. Security Banknote Co8° There, directors of the plaintiff
corporation brought an action for a preliminary injunction to undo the defendant
corporation's acquisition of Columbian Bank Note Company. The court refused
to grant the injunction, finding that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is
"to preserve the status quo pendente lite, not to undo completed transactions." 18
Presumably plaintiffs sought the preliminary injunction in an attempt to avoid
the consummated transaction distinction. The court, however, distinguished
American Crystal on the ground that in that case, a permanent injunction was at
issue, and found that the plaintiffs failed to show a threatened damage or loss,
save of future government or private antitrust actions against the corporation,
a threat it considered too remote.'82
While some cases still held to the unavailability of the private divestiture
remedy, s the Southern District of New York, in 1965, decided Julius M. Ames
Co. v. Bostitch, Inc.Y84 In Ames, the first really positive statement concerning
divestiture availability came to the fore. judge McLean stated:
178. 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), af~d, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
179. Id. at 400-01 (footnote omitted).
180. 157 F. Supp. 146 (SM.N.Y. 1957).
181. Id. at 148.
182. Id.
183. American Comm'l Barge Line Co. v. Eastern Gas Assocs., 204 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.
Ohio 1962) stated that "[aln action cannot properly be brought by a private litigant
under Section 16 of the Clayton Act ... for divestiture of assets allegedly acquired in
violation of the antitrust laws." Id. at 453. But see Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental
Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964), aft'd, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969): 'While Clayton § 7 permits private injunctive and dives-
titure actions in merger situations which may result in the proscribed restraints or monopolies,
nevertheless, no private action ... accrues from a Clayton § 7 acquisition." Id. at 717 (foot-
notes omitted).
184. 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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Neither [American Crystal nor Schrader] holds that divestiture may never be granted
under any circumstances in a private action under Section 16. No case has been found
that does so hold. I see no valid reason for accepting such a proposition. The statute
does not distinguish between types of injunctive relief. Any type would seem to be
permissible, when it is appropriate. The . . . nature and extent of the remedy to be
decreed .. is a question for the trial court .... 18
Ames did not actually order divestiture, but made it clear that the statute did not
preclude such a remedy.
In McKeon Construction v. McClatchy Newspapers,'"0 plaintiff, who ad-
vertised extensively, brought an action against defendant over the acquisition of
a television station, under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The court dismissed the section 7 claim, since the threatened
injury arose four years after the acquisition and did not satisfy the requirement
of proximate cause. However, in discussing the Sherman Act claims the court
came directly to grips with the divestiture issue:
Injunctions under Section 16 of the Clayton Act are available to prevent only 'threat-
ened loss or damage.' Within such a standard, the appropriateness of divestiture
appears to fit only a limited number of cases where no other equitable relief is avail.
able. On the other hand, where a plaintiff alleges a monopoly which restrains trade
or commerce, inflicting injury on the plaintiff, divestiture may be the only adequate
and complete remedy available. 18 7
The court appeared to be balancing the possibility of the use of such a private
action for private gain against the public interest inherent in eliminating illegal
combinations. The intent and basis of the antitrust laws is to preserve competition
and protect the consumer. It therefore seems reasonable that a private plaintiff
should be able to seek relief that will remedy his injury. If the proper relief will
also advance the competitive goals of the antitrust laws, there seems to be no
reason why such remedy should be withheld, particularly in light of the broad
imprimatur of section 16.L88
In 1970, the Northern District of California concurred with the holding in
Ames, stating that the court was "inclined to agree with [the] conclusion that
divestiture may be an appropriate form of relief under Clayton Act § 16 and that
we should not rule out the possibility of such relief .... ,"1 The case, Burkhead
185. Id. at 526.
186. 1970 Trade Cas. 173,212 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
187. Id. at 88,817 (footnote omitted).
188. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently stated that: "[T]he purpose of giving
private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private
relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws. Section
16 should be construed and applied with this purpose in mind, and with the knowledge
that the remedy it affords, like other equitable remedies, is flexible and capable of nice
'adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as
between competing private claims."' Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944))
(citations omitted).
189. Burkhead v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 308 F. Supp. 120, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,10° involved the acquisition of assets of Tidewater Oil
Company which gave defendant control over plaintiff's service station. While the
court found it unnecessary to decree divestiture, it clearly acknowledged the
possibility of doing so.
A trend, it would seem, had been established, with at least some courts viewing
divestiture as an available, if extraordinary, remedy for the private plaintiff under
section 16.
At present, with the granting of divestiture to private plaintiffs in ITT and
Calnetics, the precedential trend has realized its inevitable conclusion-two
situations in which the courts, less affected by the policy of judicial restraint,
felt that the circumstances warranted the use of divestiture to achieve effective
relief. With the possible establishment, however, of the availability of private
divestiture come numerous questions as to the appropriate standards to be em-
ployed in its granting, and the proper guidelines for its administration.
V. ANALYsis
Based on legislative history, legal precedent, Supreme Court policy in terms of
the effectiveness of divestiture in general, and recent case law, all arguments
point to the conclusion that the private divestiture remedy can be granted. It
must be recalled, however, that granting such remedy is within the equity power
of the court. As such, its use is largely discretionary, and raises the more impor-
tant question: should private divestiture be granted, and if so, in which cases
and under what circumstances?
A. Positive Factors
An inquiry into the propriety of the private divestiture remedy is an inquiry
into the current interpretation of the purpose of the antitrust laws themselves.
It is clear that the present judicial policy is against concentrations of economic
power in almost any form.19' With this in mind, the private divestiture remedy
must be viewed as empowering private attorneys general to enforce the economic
goals of the antitrust laws, the maintenance of free and open competition, free
of restraints caused by economic concentrations, and the return to that status
through legal process where required.
This is not to say that there are not private advantages to the divestiture
decree; any divestiture, be it of a vertical supplier, a horizontal competitor, or
even a conglomerate acquisition which produces cash flow advantages, will most
probably redound to the benefit of other competitors in a given field. There are
situations in which economies of scale can have given a competitor such ad-
vantage that the plaintiff may be driven out of business, or forced to incur great
190. 308 F. Supp. 120 (ND. Cal. 1970).
191. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (Clorox); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 US.
270 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Rome
Cable); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 US. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co.




expense in complete reorientation of operations if he is unable to break up the
combination. It may be argued that there are cases in which no treble-damage
award can be of any significance compared to the competitive advantage that may
be gained through the divestiture or dissolution of a competitor.
In one sense, this is the first important factor to be considered in the granting
of private divestiture: there may be no other remedy that can afford adequate
relief to the plaintiff. This factor, moreover, leads to a second important aspect.
When divestiture is granted to the private plaintiff, it serves a twofold purpose: it
gives the plaintiff relief from injury, and it also aids the public in restoring the
desired competitiveness in the product line and relevant market, thereby decreas-
ing the concentration of economic power. This effect is possible only to a much
lesser extent in the case of treble-damage awards. It should also be recalled
in this regard that the Supreme Court has recently stated that the purpose of
private remedies for antitrust violations is the enforcement of those laws in the
public interest as well as the recompense for the injury of the plaintiff.0 2 Thus,
the purpose of the antitrust laws is forwarded by the private action; where the
public interest demands divestiture, especially in cases of illegal mergers under
section 7 of the Clayton Act (as the Court has established in du Pont), then
those laws are better served by the granting of divestiture to the private plaintiff
should he have initiated the action than to require a subsequent government
action to accomplish the same end.
A third positive effect, also in the nature of promotion of the public purpose, is
the deterrent effect of the possibility of divestiture. The individual competitor,
dealing daily in his line of commerce, very quickly becomes acutely aware of
action which is working to his competitive disadvantage. If such action is caused
by illegal relationships the competitor is likely to know of them. If a competitor
can, simply by being a member of the relevant product and geographic markets,
show that his chances of competition are foreclosed to a substantial extent, and
that he may suffer future injury thereby, and may bring an action to divest
the competitor of an illegally acquired subsidiary, he is a threat to every con-
templated acquisition that borders on violation of the antitrust laws. It may
be argued that the existence of this private threat would serve as a natural curb
on those contemplating a questionable acquisition, and will deter them from
completing such a merger. This would be in addition to the deterrent effect of
Government divestiture, because, as previously noted, the Justice Department
cannot cover the entire scope of needed prosecution; a smaller firm may hope to
escape the eye of the Antitrust Division; but what chance is there to escape the
eye of his closest competitor? Thus if all private entrepreneurs are potential
plaintiffs, the risk of getting caught in an illegal acquisition and being prosecuted
for it are immensely increased.
There also remains the deterrent effect of treble-damage actions, which plays
directly upon the divestiture deterrent. Consider, for example, the case in which
a corporation acquires a subsidiary through which it expects a high degree of
profit. The threat of divestiture may be considered and dismissed on the ground
192. See note 188 supra.
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that the excessive time lag between initiation of the claim, either by Government
or private party, and the final decree will provide ample time for the accrual of
profits that will far outweigh the costs of litigation. However, the threat of large
monetary damages may take the profit motive out of the "get away with it as
long as you can" rationale.
Moreover, there is a growing realization that the "risk of acquisition" reason-
ing bears much greater risks than pure divestiture. The court may well fashion a
decree that, along with divestiture of the illegal acquisition, provides for manda-
tory injunctions that cause severe competitive disadvantages, may preclude entry
into the field even by internal expansion, and limit capabilities for a period of
years that would far outweigh the monetary advantage of the temporary acqui-
sition.193
Thus, the deterrent effect of private divestiture may, as the breadth and depth
of equitable decrees increase, provide added strength to the arguments against
chancing a questionable acquisition. It should also be noted that this same
reasoning applies to the availability of action by an acquired company. Where
such acquisition would be a disadvantage to the acquired firm, a temporary
injunction could issue; even were the cause lost on that level, the threat of
divestiture would remain. The duration of this threat could be all but permanent,
under the "sleeping giant" doctrine evolved by the Supreme Court in du Pont . T
An additional element that is crucial to the development of divestiture as a
remedy has been the concept that divestiture is not a penalty, but an equitable
return to the status quo prior to the illegal acquisition. As the Supreme Court has
said:
To require divestiture ... is not to add to the penalties that Congress has provided
in the antitrust laws. Like restitution it merely deprives the defendant of the gains
from his wrongful conduct. It is an equitable remedy designed in the public interest
to undo what could have been prevented had the defendants not outdistanced the
government in their unlawful project.195
Despite what the Court has said in terms of divestiture as being non-punitive,
and merely restitutionary, there is a punitive aspect to the Court's approach
to the remedy. The divestiture remedy becomes the preferred remedy in section 7
cases because, in addition to being sure and concrete, it does deprive the violator
of his ill-gotten gains. 196 In terms of the private divestiture decree, this concept
193. See, e.g., the decree in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
194. United States v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 US. 316 (1961). The ac-
quisition of a 23% share of General Motors by du Pont took place prior to 1920. The
action, which resulted in divestiture, was filed in 1949, and the final decree issued in 1962,
more than forty years later. While the "sleeping giant" action has been rarely invoked, it
seems clear that an anticompetitive acquisition forms a continuous violation, and may be
acted upon at any time.
195. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 US. 110, 128 (1948).
196. The question of divestiture of post-merger assets has not been settled. After-
acquired assets, those fruits of the combination that did not exist at the time of the
merger, but were acquired as a result of the merger or acquisition, have been divested in
some cases, not in others, depending upon the facts. See Antitrust Developments, supra
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of ill-gotten gain may be of particular interest. The private party who is
injured as a result of the illegal combination may be able to frame a request for
equitable relief that would partially provide recompense through the terms of the
decree. Along with divestiture, for example, the court might enjoin the violator
from competition in the violated product line, for a given period of time, thus
giving the plaintiff, and those similarly situated, a competitive advantage for
that period. This could be viewed as equitable relief in recompense for the losses
suffered during the period of violation. Such a remedy would not only provide
more complete relief for the entire market involved, but would serve as an
additional deterrent against a temporary "risk" acquisition.
As a fifth benefit, the private divestiture action would give the court necessary
flexibility in working out decrees for illegal mergers and acquisitions. Granting
divestiture would always be a possibility, but by no means a requirement. In
lieu of such a decree, where circumstances so warranted, the court is free to
fashion whatever equitable remedy or remedies the situation indicates. Thus, a
return to the status quo would be achieved through whatever means the court
found most appropriate and effective. In this regard, the private plaintiff is truly
in the position of the Attorney General; divestiture would be decreed only as
often as those cases brought by the government.
There is a strong argument, further, that allowing full relief to the private
plaintiff would reduce the multiplicity of litigation caused by government in-
junctive actions and several private treble-damage actions. Of course, not all
multiplicity could be avoided, especially in the case of treble-damage actions,
but such actions presume actual damages, not the prospective losses envisioned
under section 7. Thus, at least in section 7 cases, injunctive relief at the behest
of one plaintiff could serve as an effective adjudication of the injunctive relief
of all such competitors, as the remedy is evaluated on the basis of the violation,
not on the individual damage of the respective competitors.
Finally, there is the matter of burden of proof, and, related to this, requisite
standing of plaintiffs to maintain actions under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act. While the issue of standing is beyond the scope of this Comment, it should
be noted briefly that standing requirements are different for treble-damage
actions and for equitable claims.
In treble-damage actions, plaintiff must show actual loss occurring as the
proximate result of a violation of the antitrust laws. 197 In suits for injunctive
note 12, at 99. Two recent cases, United States v. Combustion Eng'r., Inc., 1971 Trade
Cas. II 73,648 (D. Conn. 1971), and Gates Rubber Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. fI 19,657 (FTC
1971) have required such divestiture. See Antitrust Developments, supra note 12, at 31
(Supp. 1972).
197. The plaintiff must also be within the "target area" of direct harm, which has
been defined as "within that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown
of competitive conditions in a particular industry." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's,
Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See also Dailey
v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); South Carolina Council of
Milk Producers v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1966); Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co.
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relief on the other hand,198 as in the case of mandatory injunctions and divesti-
ture, if allowed, the requirements differ for section 7 violations 90 in that proof of
loss need only be prospective, that is, that there be a threatened immediate risk of
loss or injury.200 Thus, it can be argued that the burden of proof required by a
private plaintiff suing for divestiture is easier to meet than that required for
treble damages. This may be correct, in that for treble damages, the recovery is
directly by the plaintiff, while in divestiture, the plaintiff serves as attorney gen-
eral for the good of the public at large, as well as for himself. This allows the
private plaintiff to bring an action without having first suffered actual damage,
thus making such quasi-public actions more available, and removing some of the
immense weight of litigation from the government.
All these factors serve to make the availability of the private action for
divestiture attractive, once the conclusion is reached that the goal of the anti-
trust laws is to protect the public against concentrations of economic power
entered into in violation of the statutes. However, there are countervailing
influences that may be shown to militate against such a remedy.
B. Negative Factors
Although the assumption in this section has been that private divestiture may
be granted, a negative factor that must be considered is the weight of precedent,
the possible textual interpretation, and the long history of the Clayton Act which
has, until 1972, never granted divestiture to a private party. This background
functions against court adoption of a new remedy, private divestiture, building
on policy considerations that have become part of the antitrust system. Even
if the Supreme Court approves the private divestiture remedy, courts wiU most
probably tend to use the remedy most sparingly, due to the seemingly general
abhorrence of the concept of hundreds of thousands of private attorneys general
bringing actions to divest and dissolve competitors, serving the function for
which the Justice Department (Antitrust Division) and the FTC were created,
but with none of the impartiality and overview available to the governmental
v. Lorain journal Co., 298 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1961); Productive Inventions, Inc. v.
Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
For a full discussion of standing of private plaintiffs, see Pollock, The "Injury" and
"Causation" Elements of a Private Antitrust Action, 21 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 341
(1962); Timberlake, Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 9 N.Y.L.F. 145, 172 (1963);
Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy in Violation of Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 272-74 (1964).
198. For preliminary injunctions, the same standards as in general restraining orders
are found to apply: risk of irreparable harm, that plaintiff has a real chance to prevail,
and that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiff's favor. See Hamilton Watch
Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
199. Section 16 of the Clayton Act covers threatened loss or injury under sections 2,
3 and 8 of that Act as well. See Martin, supra note 77, at 56.
200. See Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 281-82 (1964).
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agencies. It is really the fear of indiscriminate use of divestiture that is behind
this most basic "gut" reaction to the question of availability of the remedy.
Beyond this, however, there are some concrete objections to making the private
divestiture remedy available to all plaintiffs within the target area of an alleged
anti-competitive violation.
First, there is a fear of flooding of the courts with such actions. It is true that
the cost of antitrust litigation is very high. Although in treble-damage actions
costs are available to the plaintiff, as well as attorney's fees, the availability of
such fees under section 16 is unclear.201 There are arguments for allowing fees
when injunctive remedies are in the public good, therefore the courts should
be open to all claimants, without the deterrent of huge legal expenses. On the
other hand, it may be argued that the cost of litigation would serve as a control
on the flood of litigation that might otherwise occur.
Closely connected to this is the risk of frivolous litigation, or what might be
termed "candystore divestitures." The nuisance value of a divestiture suit in
which the only burden of proof is risk or threat of imminent harm may be
attractive to the less than scrupulous competitor. On the other hand, the courts
have always weighed the risk of nuisance litigation against the need for an open
door to redress grievances, and have uniformly decided that the courts must be
open to all who would bring a claim. This also should be the case in antitrust
actions.
Another consideration is the conflict between the government and private
parties. What, for example, is the effect of a government consent decree allowing
a merger under stated conditions on subsequent private divestiture actions?
Clearly, the government is not forever bound by its consent decrees, and may
bring action to have such decrees reformed as made necessary by changing con-
ditions and circumstances.202 But, must the private plaintiff show changed cir-
cumstances in order to gain divestiture in the face of a government consent
decree? If this be so, is it equitable that the government be able, by consent, to
deprive a private party of a right of action under section 16? Is it arguable that
the government must be able to reach such consent decrees, and that the com-
panies involved should be able, at least for the present, to rely upon them? If
binding effect must be given to consent decrees as regards private parties, then
a private divestiture action cannot be allowed. Section 16 would have to be
limited to preliminary relief, where, clearly, the effect of a decree by the govern-
ment would be minimal.
On the other hand, the private plaintiff cannot force the government to bring
an action, nor may he intervene as of right. Therefore, any rights that the private
plaintiff should have under the antitrust laws must either be subordinated to, or
be able to co-exist with, those of the government.
However, it seems reasonable to argue that prior consent decrees should have
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(b), 16(b) (1970).
202. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). See also Kramer, Modification of Consent Decrees:
A Proposal to the Antitrust Division, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1051 (1958).
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no bearing on the private action. If there is a violation of the antitrust laws,
action should be available to private parties. Should there be a consent decree
in effect, and should the claim be equitable, the court is free to balance the
equities, and take the effect of the consent decree into account. Further, there
are statutes of limitations applicable to antitrust actions by private parties under
the damage provisions.203 There is no reason why the equitable doctrine of
laches cannot apply in equitable actions. Also, courts might formulate a rule that
makes a valid consent decree, in force, prima fade evidence of legality; only a
showing of mistake in the granting of the consent decree would bring the private
plaintiff into the realm of equitable remedies. Therefore, the conflict between
governmental action and private action may be resolved in the discretion of the
court.
Perhaps the most significant objection to the private divestiture action lies
in the fact that the private plaintiff serves as, in effect, a representative of a class
of plaintiffs, all those similarly situated within the industry. Clearly, a divestiture
decree affects all members of the line of commerce involved. It may well be ques-
tioned whether all illegal mergers are equally detrimental to all competitors.
A vertical merger by one competitor may adversely affect several others, yet
some competitors, both horizontal and in aligned fields of endeavor, may benefit:
for example, the horizontal competitor in an excitement of consumer demand
caused by an infusion of capital, or the aligned competitor in the availability
of a component at a lower price caused by economies of scale. For the pro-
tection of competitors, it might be fruitful to consider the private injunctive
action to function much like a Rule 23 class action, to give sufficient opportunity
to protect rights. Beyond this, however, is the question: Is it proper to allow
one plaintiff to cause the divestiture of a competitor, perhaps to the detriment of
others, without granting those parties a day in court to argue on the merits?
It is this writer's opinion that the answer is a resounding yes. Class action-
type protections are possible, if needed. The Federal Rules provide for joinder
and intervention. And if there are aspects of the antitrust laws that make bene-
ficial and pro-competitive combinations illegal, then the fault is in the laws or in
their interpretation, not in the available remedy or the choice of plaintiff. Surely
when the government moves to divest an illegal merger or acquisition, there is an
even greater chance of unfairness to the individual competitor who will not get
his day in court as to the equitable remedies.
It may be argued that the government has greater fact-finding resources to
bring to bear. But even so, a private plaintiff would have to meet the same
standard of proof as the government to establish violation. If the plaintiff lacks
the necessary ammunition, he will fail in his plea for a divestiture decree. If the
same standards are applied to the granting of private divestiture as in govern-
ment suits, the requisite factual background will be the same as well. Therefore,
the plaintiff who would achieve a divestiture would be met with the same burden
as would the government.
This, indeed, is the key to the private divestiture remedy. The courts must
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(b), 16 (1970).
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view the private plaintiff suing for divestiture not as a private attorney general,
a special breed, but as an attorney general, applying the same standards and
the same controls. In this way, the private divestiture remedy can be both an
effective remedy for the injured plaintiff and a considerable boon to the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws for the good of the public at large.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is the conclusion of this analysis that the private remedy of divestiture can
be granted, does exist, and should be employed. For all the reasons previously
mentioned, the remedy is effective in furthering the goals of the antitrust laws,
and equally effective in remedying the injuries, actual and prospective, of com-
petitors so injured. But it must always be recalled that in drawing the guidelines
for a new application of an equitable remedy, the courts must move slowly and
with discretion. As Judge Wyzanski put it in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.:204
In the anti-trust field the courts have been accorded, by common consent, an authority
they have in no other branch of enacted law ... They would not have been given,
or allowed to keep, such authority in the anti-trust field, and they would not so freely
have altered from time to time the interpretation of its substantive provisions, if
courts were in the habit of proceeding with the surgical ruthlessness that might com-
mend itself to those seeking absolute assurance that there will be workable competition,
and to those aiming at immediate realization of the social, political, and economic
advantages of dispersal of power.205
204. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
205. Id. at 348.
